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In an article published in this Review in 1983, Judge Abner Mikva
contended that Congress lacks the political incentive and the institu-
tional capacity to perform a meaningful constitutional analysis ofpend-
ing legislation. Mr. Fisher disagrees with that contention and attempts
to refute it in this Article. He argues that Congress has ample resources
to perform effective constitutional analysis. Congress not only has its
own sizable staff to assist with such analysis, but it also can turn to
outside experts and counsel for advice. Mr. Fisher examines historical
and contemporary examples of constitutional debate conducted by Con-
gress to demonstrate that Congress can analyze difficult constitutional
questions effectively. Congress, in Mr. Fisher's view, is fulfilling the duty
it shares with the judiciary and the chief executive to uphold the
Constitution.
In a recent article Judge Abner J. Mikva of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit examined Congress' duty and abil-
ity to consider constitutional questions.' He concluded that Congress has
neither the institutional nor the political capacity to engage in effective constitu-
tional interpretation. Although each member of Congress takes an oath to sup-
port and defend the Constitution, Mikva contended that legislative debate, for
the most part, "does not explore the constitutional implications of pending legis-
lation; and, at best, Congress does an uneven job of considering the constitution-
ality of the statutes it adopts."
'2
Judge Mikva criticized Congress for "pass[ing] over the constitutional ques-
tions, leaving the hard decisions to the courts." 3 Constitutional issues, he said,
become "subsidiary to the desire to crack down on crime or bring administrative
agencies under control. . . .-4 Because constitutional issues "often present the
most difficult value confficts in society," it is tempting for members to sidestep
these issues and leave them to the courts, "the ultimate nay-sayers." 5 "Such
behavior by Congress is both an abdication of its role as a constitutional guard-
t Specialist, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. B.S. 1956, College of
William and Mary; Ph.D. 1967, New School for Social Research. The views expressed in this Arti-
cle are those of the author and should not be interpreted as positions of the Congressional Research
Service. The author wishes to express his appreciation for constructive critiques offered by John
Agresto, Stanley I. Bach, Phillip J. Cooper, Michael Davidson, Neal Devins, Michael J. Glennon,
Jeremy Rabkin, James W. Robinson, Morton Rosenberg, and Gregory A. Scott.
1. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 587
(1983).
2. Id. at 587.
3. Id. at 609.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 610.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ian and an abnegation of its duty of responsible lawmaking."' 6 Building on three
case studies, he advised Congress to limit its role to screening the easy cases,
rejecting patently unconstitutional legislation, providing a different viewpoint on
the Constitution, and clarifying its motivation when legislating.
7
These passages leave Congress with a mixed message. On the one hand, it
should not abdicate its responsibilities by leaving the tough constitutional issues
to the courts. On the other hand, Judge Mikva contends that it is institutionally
and politically incapable of considering the constitutional questions before them.
What is a member of Congress to do? Should Congress decide only the "easy"
constitutional issues while passing the remaining issues to the courts?
This Article pursues the issues that Judge Mikva so ably has raised. From
his unique vantage point as a federal appellate judge and former congressman,
he has identified extremely important questions about a legislator's duty to de-
termine constitutional questions. Additional facts, placed in a broader context,
are needed to understand the scope of Congress' responsibility and ability to
interpret the Constitution.
Section I reviews the doctrine of "coordinate construction" to demonstrate
that Congress, by the very nature of our political system, shares with the execu-
tive and the judiciary the duty of constitutional interpretation. Congress makes
significant contributions by participating in that constitutional dialogue. Section
II discusses the authority and competence of Congress to engage in constitu-
tional interpretation. The oath of office, the finding of facts for constitutional
law, the resolution of "political questions," and the congressional staff reforms
of recent decades are some examples that reinforce both congressional authority
and competence. Finally, section III reexamines the three case studies offered
by Judge Mikva. Despite institutional and political limitations shared with the
President and the courts, the Article concludes that Congress can perform an
essential, broad, and ongoing role in shaping the meaning of the Constitution.
I. COORDINATE CONSTRUCTION
"Even from the earliest years of the Republic," Judge Mikva writes, "the
Congressional Record casts little light on the great constitutional debates that
have periodically divided the country."'8 The historical record, however, dem-
onstrates that Congress deliberated for years on such constitutional issues as
judicial review, the Bank of the United States, congressional investigative power,
slavery, internal improvements, federalism, the war-making power, treaties and
foreign relations, interstate commerce, the removal power, and the legislative
veto long before those issues entered the courts. 9 Congressional debate was in-
6. Id.
7. Id. at 608.
8. Id. at 609.
9. See W.V ANDREWS, COORDINATE MAGISTRATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BY CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT 1-20 (judicial review), 21-43 (Bank), 44-64 (slavery), 65-95 (interstate com-
merce), 109-30 (removal power), 131-44 (war powers) (1969). For early debate on internal improve-
ments, see A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE 1789 53-84 (W.
Letwin ed. 1961). See also J. HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION 78-111 (treaties and
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tense, informed, and diligent. Indeed, it had to be, given the paucity of direction
at that time from the Supreme Court and the lower courts. This section dis-
cusses the concept of coordinate construction from different perspectives: the
debates in 1789 on the President's removal power; the concept of coordinate
construction as understood by Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Abra-
ham Lincoln; and the judicial doctrines that present the Supreme Court as the
"ultimate interpreter."
A. "The Decision of 1789"
The 1789 debate on the President's removal power occupies several hun-
dred pages of the Annals of Congress and constitutes an exceptionally penetrat-
ing examination of the doctrine of implied powers. Although some members
argued that the Senate had to be included with the President in the removal of
executive officials, others believed that these officials could be removed only
through the constitutional process of impeachment. A third camp concluded
that since Congress creates an office, it may attach to that office any condition it
deems appropriate for tenure and removal. A fourth school insisted that the
power of removal belonged exclusively to the President as an incident of his
executive power.10
Should Congress have submitted this constitutional question to the judici-
ary for resolution? Nine days before the House debate on the removal power
James Madison defended a list of constitutional amendments known collectively
as the Bill of Rights. He predicted that "independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will
be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legisla-
ture or Executive."'" When it came to the question of the removal power, how-
ever, he refused to defer to the judiciary and rejected the advice of those who
said that "it would be officious in this branch of the Legislature to expound the
Constitution, so far as it relates to the division of power between the President
and the Senate." 12 To Madison it was
incontrovertibly of as much importance to this branch of the Govern-
ment as to any other, that the Constitution should be preserved entire.
It is our duty, so far as it depends upon us, to take care that the powers
of the Constitution be preserved entire to every department of Govern-
ment .... 13
Madison continued:
foreign relations), 152-248 (removal power) (1948); C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
USES OF HISTORY 52-70, 205-10 (removal power) (1969); D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CON-
STITTrrION 49-57 (removal power), 101-118 (investigative power), 140-59 (interstate commerce),
184-203 (legislative veto) (1966); A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER (1976) (discussing constitutional deliberations by Congress from 1789 to 1829).
10. See L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
60-66 (1985).
11. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
12. Id. at 500.
13. Id.
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But the great objection drawn from the source to which the last
arguments would lead us is, that the Legislature itself has no right to
expound the Constitution; that wherever its meaning is doubtful, you
must leave it to take its course, until the Judiciary is called upon to
declare its meaning. I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of Govern-
ment, that the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon
the Judiciary. But I beg to know, upon what principles it can be con-
tended, that any one department draws from the Constitution greater
powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers of the
several departments? The Constitution is the charter of the people to
the Government; it specifies certain great powers as absolutely granted,
and marks out the departments to exercise them. If the Constitutional
boundary of either be brought into question, I do not see that any one
of these independent departments has more right than another to de-
clare their sentiments on that point.
14
In the leading case of Myers v. United States,15 Chief Justice Taft turned to
the congressional debate of 1789 to determine the scope of the President's re-
moval power. Following the discussion in the House of Representatives day by
day and vote by vote, he concluded that "there is not the slightest doubt, after an
examination of the record, that the vote was, and was intended to be, a legisla-
tive declaration that the power to remove officers appointed by the President and
the Senate vested in the President alone .... "16 He noted that Madison was
"then a leader in the House, as he had been in the Convention. His arguments
in support of the President's constitutional power of removal independently of
Congressional provision, and without the consent of the Senate, were masterly,
and he carried the House."
17
Taft relied both on the legislative discussion and the decision of the First
Congress, not because a congressional determination on a constitutional issue
is conclusive, but, first, because of our agreement with the reasons
upon which it is avowedly based; second, because this was the decision
of the First Congress, on a question of primary importance in the or-
ganization of the Government, made within two years after the Consti-
tutional Convention and within a much shorter time after its
ratification; and, third, because that Congress numbered among its
leaders those who had been members of the Convention.
18
Taft concluded that the power of removal "must remain where the Constitution
places it, with the President, as part of the executive power, in accordance with
the legislative decision of 1789 which we have been considering."' 19
While Taft based his decision on the congressional debates of 1789, the
14. Id.
15. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Congress may not regulate President's removal of officers appointed
with Senate confirmation.).
16. Id. at 114.
17. Id. at 115.
18. Id. at 136.
19. Id. at 161. For Justice Sutherland's reliance on a statement by Congressman John Marshall
in 1800 and a Senate report in 1816 to define the President's foreign affairs powers, see United States
v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
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dissenters in Myers looked to that same record and other congressional actions
to support their conclusions. Justice McReynolds, reviewing an 1835 Senate
debate, described the danger of placing unrestrained power in the Executive to
remove officials.20 He also pointed to the struggle for civil service reform, as a
method of ensuring some security of official tenure, and to the many statutes
enacted by Congress restricting the President's removal power.2 1 His reading of
the debates of 1789 did not produce the same impression of unrestrained execu-
tive power that Taft had discovered.
22
Practices after 1789 also helped to reinforce "the right of Congress to im-
pose restrictions."'23 Justice Brandeis' dissent itemized the numerous statutes
that had allowed Congress to restrict the President's removal power. That rec-
ord convinced him that a "persistent legislative practice which involves a delimi-
tation of the respective powers of Congress and the President, and which has
been so established and maintained, should be deemed tantamount to judicial
construction, in the absence of any decision by any court to the contrary." 24
Taft's doctrinaire decision was undermined repeatedly by Congress' deci-
sion to place statutory limits on the President's power to remove administrative
officials who exercised quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. In time, the
Supreme Court took account of these congressional actions and limited the
scope of Myers v. United States.25 The Court's orientation toward the removal
power was shaped and reshaped by these congressional interpretations.
B. Thomas Jefferson
Judge Mikva attributes part of the "mixed performance" of Congress "to
the fact that its proper role in making constitutional judgments has never been
firmly defined."' 26 Thomas Jefferson, he notes, envisioned that each branch of
government would act as an independent guardian of the Constitution and each
would have "the right to decide for itself what is its duty under the Constitution,
without any regard to what the others may have decided for themselves under a
similar question." 27 Following this Jeffersonian model, Judge Mikva advises
Congress not to "engage in the same kind of constitutional reasoning that is
performed by the judiciary," because this approach "forces Congress to act as a
lower federal court, reading and interpreting Supreme Court precedent." 28 Act-
ing like a lower federal court, he says, "is certainly not what Jefferson envisioned
20. Id. at 179-81 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 181 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 193-99 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 202 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 283 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,
469 (1915)).
25. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (President lacked authority to remove a
member of an adjudicatory commission); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935) (Congress may restrict President's power to remove officers performing quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative duties).
26. Mikva, supra note 1, at 587.
27. Id. at 587-88 (citing 1 THE JEFERSON ENCYCLOPEDIA 190 (J. Foley ed. 1900)).
28. Id. at 607.
1985]
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for Congress; Congress should be able to make its own decisions rather than
having to predict what the Supreme Court would do-a function that is presum-
ably already being performed by the judicial system."
'29
Although Congress should be able to make its own decisions rather than
merely anticipate Supreme Court decisions, Jefferson's solution was much more
radical. He made his own decisions on constitutional issues even after the other
branches had announced their positions. Believing the Alien and Sedition Acts
to be unconstitutional, Jefferson and his followers were appalled when the fed-
eral courts failed to strike them down.30 Once in office as President, Jefferson
"discharged every person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition
law."' 31 He believed
that law to be a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had
ordered [the people] to fall down and worship a golden image; and that
it was as much [his] duty to arrest its execution in every stage, as it
would have been to have rescued from the fiery furnace those who
should have been cast into it for refusing to worship the image.
3 2
Thus, Jefferson did more than envision the three branches as "co-ordinate
and independent of each other."' 33 Acts by one branch were not to control later
considerations by another branch. 34 Writing to Judge Spencer Roane, Jefferson
stated that each branch was "truly independent of the others, and has an equal
right to decide for itself what is the meaning of the Constitution in the cases
submitted to its action; and especially, where it is to act ultimately and without
appeal."' 35 Jefferson's theory could produce as many meanings of the Constitu-
tion as there are branches of government, and possibly more, given the freedom
of each new Congress and each new President to discard interpretations of their
predecessors. The country would face a plethora of conflicting, shifting interpre-
tations, all of equal weight. Under this theory, for example, President Nixon
might have been at liberty to insist that his view of executive privilege had the
same merit and authority as that of the Supreme Court.
36
C. Andrew Jackson
Andrew Jackson's view of coordinate construction was less threatening to
29. Id.
30. See 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 215 (1937).
31. 11 THE WRITNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 43 (Bergh ed. 1904) (letter to Mrs. John Ad-
ams, July 22, 1804).
32. Id. at 43-44.
33. Id. at 213 (letter to George Hay, June 2, 1807).
34. Id. at 213-14. For further insight into Jefferson's position on the nullity of the Alien and
Sedition Act, see 12 THE WRINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 31, at 288-90 (letter to
Wilson C. Nicholas, June 13, 1809); 14 THE WRrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 31, at
116 (letter to Gideon Granger, Mar. 9, 1814); 15 THE WRrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
31, at 214 (letter to Judge Spencer Roane, Sept. 6, 1819).
35. 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 31, at 214 (letter to Judge Spencer
Roane, Sept. 6, 1819).
36. See J. AGRESro, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 83 (1984).
But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (separation of powers doctrine cannot justify an
absolute unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process in all circumstances).
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the rule of law. Although Jackson inherited the Jeffersonian criticism of the
judiciary, he realized that the federal courts were an important source of polit-
ical authority for turning back the nullification doctrine. He realized that it
might be necessary to form an alliance between the presidency and the judiciary
to keep the nation intact.
37
Jackson's theory of coordinate construction was announced in his message
vetoing the bill that would have rechartered the Bank of the United States in
1832. Although the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the
Bank, 38 and advocates of the Bank maintained that "its constitutionality in all
its features ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision of
the Supreme Court," Jackson did not agree with this view. 39 He concluded that
"mere precedent" should not be decisive in questions of constitutional power
"except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as
well settled." 4 The legislative record on the Bank, he pointed out, was full of
contradictions. Congress favored the Bank in 1791, but voted against it in 1811.
Congress again rejected the Bank in 1815, but supported it a year later. More-
over, sentiment from the states was generally hostile to the Bank.
41
If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of
this act, it ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this Gov-
ernment. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for
itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public
officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he
will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by
others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the
Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any
bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or ap-
proval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before
them for judical decision. The opinion of the judges has no more au-
thority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the
judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. The
authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to
control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative
capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reason-
ing may deserve.
42
Jackson's theory of coordinate construction therefore embodied a number
of constraints not found in Jefferson's model. Judicial precedents could govern
other governmental bodies' actions only if those bodies acquiesced to them. The
authority of the Supreme Court could not control Congress or the Executive
37. Longaker, Andrew Jackson and the Judiciary, 71 POL. ScI. Q. 341 (1956). Despite Jack-
son's well-known animosity for some members of the judiciary, particularly Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, and political conflict between Jackson and the courts, Jackson was a firm believer in the
importance of a vigorous and powerful court system and the principles of judicial review. Id. at 364.
38. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819).
39. 3 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1144 (J. Richardson
ed. 1897).
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"when acting in their legislative capacities," and the influence of the Court in
such instances would depend on "the force of their reasoning." Jackson believed
that each public officer should support the Constitution "as he understands it,
and not as it is understood by others." He did not embrace, however, the Jeffer-
sonians' unyielding hostility toward the courts. Rather, he viewed the courts as
potential allies in building a stable political order.
D. Abraham Lincoln
Abraham Lincoln's July 17, 1858 speech at Springfield, Illinois also is com-
patible with democratic principles and the rule of law. Stephen Douglas, Lin-
coln's opponent in the 1858 Senate race, had announced his support of the year-
old Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.43 Lincoln limited his
support of that decision by saying that "in so far as it decided in favor of Dred
Scott's master and against Dred Scott and his family, I do not propose to disturb
or resist the decision."'44 Lincoln, however, did not agree with Douglas' whole-
hearted endorsement, which Lincoln characterized as having "the citizen con-
form his vote to that decision; the Member of Congress, his; the President, his
use of the veto power. He would make it a rule of political action for the people
and all the departments of the government."'45 By resisting the decision "as a
political rule," he said he would "disturb no right of property, create no disor-
der, excite no mobs."
46
What Lincoln challenged was the inference in Dred Scott that the nation
should remain divided between those free and those enslaved. He opposed the
spread of slavery to the new territories, rejecting the Court's decison as a basis
for nationalizing Negro slavery. His philosophy of government looked not to
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott but to the principles incorporated in
the Declaration of Independence. He asked Douglas and his adherents if they
wanted to amend the Declaration to read that "all men are created equal except
negroes."
47
My declarations upon this subject of negro slavery may be misrep-
resented, but can not be misunderstood. I have said that I do not un-
derstand the Declaration to mean that all men were created equal in all
respects. They are not our equal in color; but I suppose that it does
mean to declare that all men are equal in some respects; they are equal
in their right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Certainly
the negro is not our equal in color-perhaps not in many other re-
spects; still, in the right to put into his mouth the bread that his own
hands have earned, he is the equal of every other man, white or black.
In pointing out that more has been given you, you can not be justified
in taking away the little which has been given him. All I ask for the
43. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
44. 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 516 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (speech at
Springfield, Ill., July 17, 1858).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 520.
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negro is that if you do not like him, let him alone. If God gave him but
little, that little let him enjoy.
48
Lincoln refused to defer to Dred Scott and to allow it to set the moral tone
and political direction of the United States. At stake was not an abstract or
technical question of law but rather the future of the country. Every citizen had
a duty to express opinions and help shape the contours of constitutional struc-
tures and rights. "Like politics, with which it was inextricably joined, the Con-
stitution was everybody's business." 4 9 To Lincoln, the Supreme Court was a
coequal, not superior, branch of government. The Court existed as one branch
of a political system, subject to a combination of checks and balances, including
the force of public opinion. Thus, in his inaugural address in 1861, he denied
that constitutional questions could be settled solely by the Supreme Court. If
government policy on "vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevo-
cably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court. . .the people will have ceased to
be their own rulers . . . .-0 Congress and the President were free to reach
their own constitutional judgments, even if at odds with past Court rulings, and
then let the Court decide again.
E. Judicial Doctrines
Beginning with Chief Justice Marshall's declaration in Marbury v. Madison
that "[it] is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is," 51 the Supreme Court has insisted that it alone delivers the
"final word" on the meaning of the Constitution. Marbury "declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution .... -52 The Court reasserted this principle in 1962:
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether action of
that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a
delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility
of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
53
Being "ultimate interpreter," however, is not the same as being exclusive
interpreter. The courts expect other branches of government to interpret the
Constitution in their initial deliberations. "In the performance of assigned con-
stitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the
Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great
respect from the others."'5 4 Congressional interpretations are given substantial
48. Id.
49. H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECON-
STRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1975).
50. 7 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 39, at
3210.
51. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
52. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
53. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). The notion that the Supreme Court is the "ulti-
mate interpreter" was repeated in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
54. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
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weight in some circumstances, even to the point of becoming the controlling
factor.
5"
Congressional and executive practices over a number of years can be in-
strumental in fixing the meaning of the Constitution.5 6 The Supreme Court,
upholding the President's removal power in a 1903 decision, based its ruling
largely on the "universal practice of the government for over a century."5 7 Pres-
idential action in which Congress has acquiesced can become a justification for
the exercise of power.58 Courts also will defer to agency interpretations if they
consistently are construed and made a repeated matter of public record.5 9 The
weight of these customs has transformed the Constitution over time.
6°
Moreover, being the "ultimate interpreter" does not grant the judiciary su-
periority in the sense that final judgments are unreviewable. Eight years before
writing Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney wrote a dissenting opinion in which he
noted that the Court's opinion "upon the construction of the Constitution is
always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and
that its judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the
reasoning by which it is supported. '6 1 Referring to Taney's dissent, Justice
Frankfurter spoke about the need for "judicial exegesis" in interpreting broadly
phrased charters like the Constitution. To Frankfurter, "the ultimate touch-
stone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it."
'62
These comments by Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Taney, and Frankfurter
demonstrate that the Supreme Court is the "ultimate interpreter" only when its
decisions have been accepted as reasonable and persuasive by the people and
other governmental units. This test does not require deference to the judiciary
because of its purported technical ability and political isolation. Each decision is
subject to scrutiny and rejection by private citizens and public officials. If courts
indeed did have the last word, we could not justify our efforts in law reviews and
other forums to evaluate recent decisions and doctrines.
55. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (In the context of a challenge to male-only
registration for military service, the Court noted: "The customary deference accorded the judgments
of Congress is certainly appropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered the Act's
constitutionality.").
56. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (Dismissing a challenge that the
Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional, the Court stated that "practice, and acquiescence under
it, for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an
irresistible answer, and had indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the
most forcible nature.").
57. Shurtleffv. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316 (1903).
58. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (Presidential decisions over
a period of years "clearly indicate that the long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by
Congress, would raise a presumption that the withdrawals had been made in pursuance of its consent
or of a recognized administrative power of the Executive in the management of the public lands,").
59. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) (when an executive officer's interpretation is not
unreasonable and has been made a repeated matter of public record, courts must respect it).
60. For an effective critique of court doctrines on custom and acquiescence, see Glennon, The
Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REv. 109 (1984).
61. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
62. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939).
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What is "final" at one stage of our political development may be reopened
at some later date, leading to fresh interpretation and overruling of past judicial
doctrines. Courts are the ultimate interpreter of a particular case, but not of the
larger issue of which that case is a part. Disagreement with a particular decision
can lead to new litigation testing the same issue. Although Judge Mikva stated
that the constitutional system "was designed to give the courts the final say,"
63
he also described the Constitution as "a living document that evolves over time;
pressure on the Court from Congress to reevaluate the meaning of the Constitu-
tion is not always detrimental."' Courts are at liberty to review prior holdings
and reverse or distinguish cases that seem wrongly decided. The Court is espe-
cially prone to abandon the doctrine of stare decisis when the Court discovers
errors of constitutional doctrine.65 Executives, legislators, and the general pub-
lic also should be free to participate in periodic reexaminations; the process of
reconsideration should not be the exclusive province of judges.
II. AUTHORITY AND COMPETENCE
Although acknowledging that "there is a role for Congress to play in mak-
ing constitutional judgments," Judge Mikva noted that the "ability of Congress
to do so is less certain."'6 6 He concluded that both institutionally and politically,
Congress "is designed to pass over the constitutional questions, leaving the hard
decisions to the courts."
67
[B]oth [H]ouses are large, making the process of engaging in complex
arguments during a floor debate difficult. For the most part, the
speeches made on the floor are designed to get a member's position on
the record rather than to initiate a dialogue. Because of the volume of
legislation, the time spent with constituents, and the technical knowl-
edge required to understand the background of every piece of legisla-
tion, it is infrequent that a member considers the individual merits of a
particular bill. Often a vote is determined by a thumbs up-or-down
sign by the party leader, or by a political debt that needs to be repaid.
While it is true. .. that a majority of the members of Congress are
lawyers, they have not kept up-to-date on recent legal developments.
In fact, most Supreme Court opinions never come to the attention of
Congress. Unlike judges, the Representatives and Senators are almost
totally dependent on the recommendations of others in making consti-
tutional judgments.
68
Judge Mikva further noted that Congress is a "reactive body" unable to
pass legislation until problems reach "crisis proportions"; under such pressure
to enact a bill, Congress "is not primarily concerned with the law's details."
69
63. Mikva, supra note 1, at 610-11.
64. Id. at 608.
65. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM.
L. REv. 735, 736 (1949).
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Moreover, constitutional interests affected by a bill "are generally abstract, un-
popular, and fail to capture the imagination of either the media or the public."70
Judge Mikva finds constitutional debate by members of Congress "superficial
and, for the most part, self-serving."'71 The "most likely place for constitutional
dialogue is in the committees."' 72 Even with the advantages of committee size
and format, however, "the urgency of the issues, the reliance of members on
others for guidance, and the complexity of the problems presented often prevent
meaningful congressional constitutional analysis."
' 73
Congress certainly suffers from these and other problems. Even when
members debate a constitutional issue it may be for purely tactical reasons-
such as trying to deep-six a bill-rather than for genuine and sincere concerns
about protecting the Constitution. For all its structural weaknesses, however,
Congress can find virtues among its vices. Constitutional law often turns on
factfinding and the balancing of conflicting values. Members of Congress can
make important contributions in both areas. Reforms of recent decades also
have increased the capability of members to participate in constitutional debate
and to honor their commitment to support the Constitution.
A. Oath of Office
Members of Congress are constitutionally required to take an oath "to sup-
port th[e] [C]onstitution. '' 74 As specified by statute, members
solemnly swear. . . [to] support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;. . . [to] bear
true faith and allegiance to the same; . . . [to] take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and...
[to] well and faithfully discharge the duties [of their office]. 75
The assertion in Marbury v. Madison that "[ilt is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"' 76 does not relieve
members of Congress of the duty to debate constitutional questions at the time a
bill is under consideration. The duty and oath to support and defend the Consti-
tution are not cancelled by claims of institutional incompetence or personal un-
certainty. Members swear or affin to defend the Constitution "without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."'77 As Paul Brest has written: "Many
legislators are not lawyers; the legislative process is not structured to allow con-
stitutional questions to be examined systematically or dispassionately; and many
constitutional problems arise only as legislation is implemented. Although these
points may argue for judicial review, they do not argue against an initial legisla-




74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 3.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1982).
76. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1982).
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tive examination." 78
Some provisions of the Constitution are addressed explicitly to members of
Congress and cannot be evaded by the anticipation of judicial review. The Con-
stitution mandates, for example, that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed."' 79 Accordingly, members should make a constitutional deter-
mination on this issue prior to, not after, a bill's passage. Similarly, the first
amendment commands that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." °80 It would be
unseemly for members to legislate blindly, expecting the judiciary to correct the
constitutional problem at some future date.8 ' Furthermore, members of Con-
gress must scrutinize a bill for constitutional defects because it is the practice of
courts not to pass on the constitutionality of a statute if it can be construed
solely on statutory grounds.8 2 As Justice Brandeis noted in 1936, the Court has
developed a series of rules "under which it has avoided passing upon a large part
of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision." s3 When the
validity of a congressional statute is questioned, "and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised," the Court first will determine whether the statute
can be construed to avoid the constitutional question. 84 "It is well settled that if
a case may be decided on either statutory or constitutional grounds, [the] Court,
for sound jurisprudential reasons, will inquire first into the statutory
question."
85
Legislative precedents in the House of Representatives do not permit the
Speaker or the Chair to rule on questions of constitutionality. Points of order
raising the issue of unconstitutional provisions are referred to the House for
resolution.86 Under Senate practices whenever a member raises a question of
constitutionality the Chair submits the question to the Senate for decision.8 7 A
fascinating example of this custom occurred in 1984 after Senator Mack Mat-
tingly offered an amendment to give the President item-veto authority over ap-
propriations bills. He proposed an override vote of a majority of each chamber
78. Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 585, 588 (1975).
79. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
81. Brest, supra note 78, at 587.
82. See United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980).
83. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 348 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
85. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-07 (1980).
86. 2 A. HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 1255, 1318-1320,
1322, 1490-1491 (1907) [hereinafter cited as A. HINDS' PRECEDENTS]; 4 A. HINDS' PRECEDENTS,
supra, at § 3507; see 8 C. CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 2225,
3031, 3071, 3427 (1936) [hereinafter cited as C. CANNON'S PRECEDENTS]; 94 CONG. REc. 5817
(1948); 93 CONG. REC. 9522-23 (1947).
87. SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. Doc. No. 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
538-39 (1981).
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rather than the two-thirds required by the Constitution.88 After Senator Law-
ton Chiles expressed concern about "rewriting the Constitution" by statute,89
Senator Alan Dixon admitted that "as a lawyer, I have some difficulty about the
constitutional viability of this approach." 90 Dixon nevertheless attempted to
dispose of the constitutional issue by stating that "it is for the courts, not the
Senate. Nobody knows, because the courts have never ruled . . . . It comes
down, then, to the question of whether this is a good idea." 9 1
Senator Pete Domenici, however, regarded the amendment as unconstitu-
tional; he disagreed "that something as patently unconstitutional as this ought to
be passed" and then transferred to the courts for resolution.92 Senator John
Stennis also opposed the amendment, stating that it failed to touch the "top,
side, or botton [sic] of the real Constitution that we have and live under;"
93
Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker concluded that the amendment at-
tempted "to deal with a constitutional issue in a statutory form."
94
Senator Chiles then raised a point of order "that the bill is legislation which
changes the Constitution of the United States." 95 Following Senate precedents,
the Chair submitted the question to the Senate. Before the question could be
debated, however, Senator Mattingly moved to table the point of order. That
tactic failed by the vote of forty-five to forty-six. 96 During debate on the point of
order, Senator Baker said that just as the Supreme Court could review and pass
on the enactments of Congress, "it is equally true, and the precedent is just as
old, that the Senate of the United States must first exercise its own judgment as
to whether a matter before it conforms with or violates the Constitution."
97
With regard to prior statements that courts had not yet ruled on the statutory
grant of item-veto power to the President, Chiles remarked that the question "is
so clear that no court, from a justice of the peace on, has ever had to rule on
it."98 Dixon responded that the law "is unsettled" and that the "only question
is whether we have the courage to let the Supreme Court of the United States
decide. This Senate is not the place where 100 separate Senators make that kind
of judicial decision. . . ."99 He admitted that as a lawyer he had "doubts and
reservations about whether [the Congress could] do it. But I want to do some-
thing to reduce our budget deficits."'1°
Senator Slade Gorton found the arguments in favor of the amendment
88. 130 CONG. REC. S5297 (daily ed. May 3, 1984).
89. Id. at S5304.
90. Id. at S5305.
91. Id. Senator Mattingly also noted that he was "willing to let the constitutional questions be
decided in their proper judicial forums." Id. at S5307.
92. Id. at S5310.
93. Id. at S5311.
94. Id. at S5312.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at S5313.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at S5314.
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"profoundly disturbing" because none of the proponents seemed to believe that
the proposal was constitutional. He chided Senators Dixon and Mattingly,
stating:
[Y]ou swore an oath, as I did, when you became Members of this body
to uphold the Constitution of the United States. You cannot hide be-
hind the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has final
authority on constitutional questions. You cannot hide behind that
proposition to ignore your own duty properly to interpret the Consti-
tution, which you have inherited after 200 years of history. It is your
duty to make a judgment as to whether or not this amendment is
constitutional.
If you can in good faith say you believe that it is, you can vote in
the way which the Senator from Illinois has made a claim. But to
duck your responsibility on the ground that sometime, at some future
date, the Supreme Court will have final authority over the question is
to ignore the oath which you swore when you became a Member of
this body.
10 1
Senator Paul Sarbanes, siding with Gorton and Chiles, agreed that there
had been no prior litigation on the proposal because it was "patently unconstitu-
tional."10 2 He offered this analogy:
Suppose someone submitted a legislative proposal to change the term
of the President to [two] years, or the Senate to four, or the House to
three. Suppose I put in that legislative proposal; then say, well, the
Supreme Court has never ruled on this question. . . .What happens
to our own responsibility to make a judgment to uphold the Constitu-
tion, and make a judgment with respect to whether a proposition
before us has any slim claim to constitutional validity?'
10 3
The Senate rejected the Mattingly Amendment, voting fifty-six to thirty-
four in favor of Chiles' point of order. 1° 4 It is impossible to determine which
Senators debated the constitutional issue because it was the simplest way to de-
feat an amendment they opposed on policy grounds. Clearly a constitutional
issue was present, particularly the balance of power between the executive and
legislative branches, and it is important to note that Senate rules allow a member
to make a point of order solely on constitutional grounds. It also is significant
that some of the Senators viewed their oath of office as a requirement that they
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at S5314-15. Senator Dale Bumpers supported Sarbanes' thesis with the following
comments:
Each one of us held up our hand, took the oath of office, and said we will uphold the
Constitution of the United States.
There was no caveat. You did not say, "I will uphold the Constitution of the United
States only on those cases where precedent is well established." You did not say, "I will
uphold the Constitution unless something is presented to the Senate that the Court has
never ruled on, in which case I will vote for it so the Supreme Court can rule."
Id. at S5315.
104. Id. at S5323.
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determine the constitutionality of pending bills and amendments instead of de-
ferring those questions to the courts for disposition.
B. Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law
The Supreme Court recognizes that much of constitutional law depends on
factfinding, which is a particular strength of Congress. After decades of apply-
ing substantive due process to economic regulation, which allowed the courts to
strike down efforts by Congress and state legislatures to regulate such economic
areas as minimum wages, maximum hours, prices, and working conditions, the
Supreme Court decided that it no longer would sit as a superlegislature.105
Since 1937 the Court has been content to leave the broad area of economic rights
and government regulation to congressional judgment. Unless the actions of
Congress and its delegated agents can be shown clearly to be arbitrary or beyond
the limits of due process, judicial inquiry "is at an end." 10 6 When the judiciary
determines that legislators have chosen a "rational basis" for carrying out the
commerce power, for example, the Court's investigation ceases.107
In 1966 the Court adopted a broad interpretation of the power of Congress
"to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment. At issue in Katzenbach v. Morgan'08 was the power of Congress to pro-
hibit New York's literacy requirement as a precondition for voting. Section 4(e)
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965109 provided that no person who had completed
the sixth grade in Puerto Rico could be denied the right to vote in any election
because of an inability to read or write in English. Although important constitu-
tional issues of federalism were at stake, the Court concluded that section 4(e)
was "a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress by § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment ." 110 Factfinding was a legislative, not a judicial,
responsibility.
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess
and weigh the various conflicting considerations-the risk or perva-
siveness of the discrimination in governmental services, the effective-
ness of eliminating the state restriction on the right to vote as a means
of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or availability of alternative rem-
edies, and the nature and significance of the state interests that would
be affected by the nullification of the English literacy requirement as
applied to residents who have successfully completed the sixth grade in
a Puerto Rican school. It is not for us to review the congressional
105. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941) ("We are not concerned, however, with the
wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation."); see also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730
(1963) (same; quoting Olsen, 313 U.S. at 246).
106. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942).
107. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
303-04 (1964). For a discussion of the capacity of courts to engage in factfinding, see Alfange, The
Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966); Karst, Legisla-
tive Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. Cr. REV. 75.
108. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
109. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)
(1982)).
110. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646.
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resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a
basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did. 111
Even Justice Harlan acknowledged in his dissent that section five of the
fourteenth amendment "does give to the Congress wide powers in the field of
devising remedial legislation to effectuate the Amendment's prohibition on arbi-
trary state action . " 112 Decisions on equal protection and due process, he
said, "are based not on abstract logic, but on empirical foundations. To the
extent 'legislative facts' are relevant to a judicial determination, Congress is well
equipped to investigate them, and such determinations are of course entitled to
due respect." 113 Harlan nevertheless dissented because he believed that the
question was whether the New York law was "so arbitrary or irrational as to
offend the command of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. That question is one for the judicial branch ultimately to determine."
114
The majority opinion, however, held that a construction of section five that
"would require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state law
precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the
congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness
and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment." 115 The is-
sue was not simply a factual determination by Congress that was better resolved
by the legislature than the judiciary. It also was a factual dispute between the
national legislature and a state legislature. To Harlan, the majority read section
five "as giving Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the
Amendment."1
16
Katzenbach v. Morgan spawned a burgeoning literature on the power of
Congress to invoke section five of the fourteenth amendment. One commentator
claimed that the Morgan Court suggested that "to some extent at least, § 5 ex-
empts the Fourteenth Amendment from the principle of Court-Congress rela-
tionships expressed by Marbury v. Madison, that the judiciary is the final arbiter
of the meaning of the Constitution." 117 This assertion goes too far. Although
the Court treats congressional determinations under section five with respect
and a substantial degree of deference, it still must "perceive a basis upon which
the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."1 18 The Morgan Court also
noted that congressional power under section five
is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the
Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or
dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment authorizing
111. Id. at 653.
112. Id. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 667 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 648.
116. Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power
Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72
Nw. U.L. REv. 656 (1977); Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process Rights, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 1265 (1980).
117. Burt, Miranda and Title 11- A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. Cr. REV. 81, 84.
118. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
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the States to establish racially segregated systems of education would
not be-as required by § 5-a measure 'to enforce' the Equal Protec-
tion Clause since that clause of its own force prohibits such state
laws.11 9
As an example of judicial line-drawing, in 1970 the Court ruled that section five
did not empower Congress to lower the voting age to eighteen in state elec-
tions. 120 Congress responded by passing the twenty-sixth amendment.
A contemporary dispute concerns the effort of some members of Congress
to use section five to alter the jurisdiction of federal courts to deal with abortion.
Hearings in 1981 explored the use of section five as a vehicle for overturning the
Supreme Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade abortion decision. 12 1 Advocates of the
"Human Life Bill" proposed that the word "person" in the fourteenth amend-
ment be defined to include life beginning at conception. They argued that Con-
gress would be exercising a judgment over "facts," not "law." 122 The Roe
Court, however, based its decision not on a factual or philosophical determina-
tion of when life begins, but rather on a legal interpretation of the meaning of
"person" under the fourteenth amendment. The Court decided that a fetus was
not a person in a constitutional sense. 123 It therefore announced a constitu-
tional, not a legislative, finding.
Although congressional use of section five is subject to limitations and re-
mains a topic of controversy, the application of the equal protection clause or
the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment depends heavily on congres-
sional factfinding and judgments. The problems of application "quite genuinely
involve investigation and evaluation of facts. These are areas in which Congress
has at least some claims to superior competence while the Court has none."
124
Similarly, the fifteenth amendment, which prohibits states from restricting
voting on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, grants Con-
gress the power to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. 12 5 The
Supreme Court has deferred to congressional interpretations so long as Congress
uses "any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial
discrimination in voting." 126 Congress is "chiefly responsible" for implementing
the rights created in the fifteenth amendment.127
Just as Judge Mikva can raise questions about the capacity of Congress to
119. Id. at 651-52 n. 10; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (judicial deference to
congressional interpretations of § 5 of fourteenth amendment).
120. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. 1 The Human Life Bilk Hearings Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 197-233 (1981) (testimony and article by Stephen H. Galebach).
123. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58.
124. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CiN. L. REv. 199, 255
(1971).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
126. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
127. Id. at 326; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) ("It is clear,
then, that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may prohibit practices that in and of
themselves do not violate § 1 of the Amendment, so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrim-
ination in voting are 'appropriate' .... ").
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engage in effective constitutional interpretation, in part because of institutional
deficiencies, judicial activism has been challenged on the ground that federal
judges lack both the authority and the capacity to decide questions of broad
social policy. Donald Horowitz has identified some of the characteristics of ad-
judication that limit the reliability of judicial decisions. Among those limita-
tions is the difficulty of determining social facts through the judicial factfinding
process. 128 The issue, therefore, is not simply one of measuring the competence
of Congress against an ideal standard, but of comparing legislative to judicial
competence. Because both branches have their strengths and their weaknesses,
an open dialogue between Congress and the courts is a more fruitful avenue for
constitutional interpretation than simply believing that the judiciary possesses
certain superior skills. If we count the times that Congress has been "wrong"
about the Constitution and compare those lapses with the occasions on which
the Supreme Court has been "wrong" by its own later admissions, the results
make a compelling case for legislative confidence and judicial modesty.
C. Political Questions
Members of Congress must deal with a number of constitutional issues that
are never decided by the courts because of such threshold issues as standing,
jurisdiction, and "political questions." Courts have stated their reluctance to
decide an issue when there has been "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment. . . to a coordinate political department." 129 Although this "ter-
ritory" of political questions varies over time and gives ground on occasion to
permit greater judicial involvement,130 the scope of congressional and presiden-
tial responsibility for constitutional interpretation remains substantial.
The Constitution empowers Congress
[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appoint-
ment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia accord-
ing to the discipline prescribed by Congress.'
31
When this clause was interpreted in the Kent State University decision, the
Supreme Court regarded the supervision of the National Guard as a matter
vested solely in Congress. The Court noted that "it is difficult to conceive of an
area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence."'
132
Courts also defer to Congress in cases that lack "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving" a dispute.' 33 Is thirteen years too long a
128. D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45-51 (1977); see also Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1978) (discussing nature of adjudicatory
processes).
129. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
130. See, ag., Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969); Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
131. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
132. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
133. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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time to allow states to ratify a constitutional amendment? The Supreme Court
decided that it lacked statutory and constitutional criteria for a judicial determi-
nation of this issue. The question of a reasonable time involved "an appraisal of
a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic, which can
hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a
court of justice .. ."134
Courts are loath to adjudicate when it is impossible to decide a controversy
"without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion." 135 Did President Reagan violate the War Powers Resolution by sending
military advisers to El Salvador? The factfinding necessary to resolve this dis-
pute rendered the case nonjusticiable because that question was "appropriate for
congressional, not judicial, investigation and determination." 
136
Other constitutional questions are denied judicial resolution because the
plaintiffs are unable to establish standing. The Constitution provides an explicit
safeguard for financial accountability: "[A] regular Statement and Account of
the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
to time." 137 The failure of Congress to publish the expenditures of the Central
Intelligence Agency prompted a lawsuit by William Richardson, but a series of
rulings from 1969 to 1974 ended with the Supreme Court's decison that Rich-
ardson lacked standing to maintain his suit. 138 The interpretation of the state-
ment and account clause therefore is left to Congress. Thus far, Congress has
concluded that publication of the expenditures of the intelligence community,
even in aggregate, poses too much risk to national security.
139
Standing also has barred adjudication of the incompatibility clause, which
states that no officer of the United States "shall be a Member of either House
during his Continuance in Office."' 14 Efforts to litigate this clause have been
turned back by the courts on the ground of standing. 14 1 Instead, the boundaries
of this clause of the Constitution have been defined by various House and Senate
precedents. 142
Moreover, the courts have done little to clarify the meaning of the ineligibil-
ity clause, which prohibits Senators and Representatives from being appointed
"to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such
134. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453 (1939) (Congress had final determination on number
of years needed to ratify the Child Labor Amendment).
135. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
136. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 17.
138. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
139. L. FISHER, supra note 10, at 249-51.
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
141. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (class action
challenging the Reserve membership of members of Congress as violating the incompatibility clause
dismissed for lack of standing).
142. 6 C. CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 86, §§ 60-65; 2 L. DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS
124-39 (1977); 1 A. HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 86, §§ 485-506.
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time." 14 3 As Judge Mikva knows from his own experience, the courts punt this
constitutional issue back to Congress. Because of Mikva's longtime advocacy of
gun control, the National Rifle Association (NRA) spent an estimated $700,000
to block his nomination to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. When that effort was unsuccessful, the NRA went to court
and raised the issue of ineligibility. With Senator McClure serving as plaintiff,
the NRA argued that the salaries of federal judges had been increased during
Mikva's term in Congress. 144 A three-judge court ruled that McClure lacked
standing to challenge the validity of an appointment of a federal judge. The
court stated that McClure and his colleagues had had their opportunity to vote
against Mikva's confirmation in the Senate. Senators on the losing side could
not then ask the judiciary to reverse the Senate's action. 145
A member's ability to gain standing does not mean that courts will decide a
constitutional question. After passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil-
ity Act (TEFRA) of 1982, twenty members of the House of Representatives filed
suit to contest what they regarded to be the Senate's violation of the origination
clause. 146 The House had passed a bill reducing tax revenues and the Senate
had added amendments to increase revenues by more than $98 billion over three
years.147 A motion by Congressman Rousselot to return the bill to the Senate to
correct what he considered a contravention of the origination clause was tabled
by the House.148 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit concluded that the congressional appellants had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the tax bill under the origination clause, it dis-
missed the case as an exercise of its discretion to withhold declaratory relief for
prudential reasons.' 4 9 The court stated that it was "reluctant to meddle in the
internal affairs of the legislative branch, and the doctrine of remedial discretion
properly permits us to consider the prudential, separation-of-powers concerns




Judge Mikva claims that "most Supreme Court opinions never come to the
attention of Congress. Unlike judges, the Representatives and Senators are al-
most totally dependent on the recommendations of others in making constitu-
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; see Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam); 42 Op.
Att'y Gen. 381 (1969); 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 88 (1922).
144. Benenson, A Well-Armed NRA Draws a Bead on High-Calibre Judge, NAV'L LJ., October
13, 1980, at 15, 40.
145. McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho), aff'd sub nom. McClure v. Reagan, 454
U.S. 1025 (1981).
146. "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Sen-
ate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
147. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
148. Id. at 949.
149. Id. at 956.
150. Id.
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tional judgments." 151 His first sentence is footnoted to a study published in
1965.152 The author of that study, Samuel Krislov, did not offer documentation
or support for his claim, and there is reason to doubt the sweeping nature of the
statement. More significantly, the institutional capability of Congress has im-
proved markedly since 1965.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970153 explicitly recognized the
need within Congress for a more systematic and continuing review of court deci-
sions that affect legislative prerogatives. Congress had been represented in court
by the Department of Justice and the occasional appearances of Senators, Repre-
sentatives, and attorneys acting as amici curiae, but this sporadic effort was un-
satisfactory. A Senate committee in 1966 concluded that the effect of court
decisions on Congress "should be a matter of continuous concern for which
some agency of the Congress should take responsibility.
' 154
The 1970 statute created a Joint Committee on Congressional Operations
and made it responsible for identifying "any court proceeding or action which,
in the opinion of the Joint Committee, is of vital interest to the Congress, or to
either House of the Congress, as a constitutionally established institution of the
Federal Government. . . ."55 Congress directed the Joint Committee to make
periodic reports and recommendations to the Senate and House.
156
Starting in 1971, the Joint Committee began publishing a series of reports
on legal proceedings of interest to Congress. After the Joint Committee's tenure
expired in 1977, the task of publishing the report fell to a newly created House
Select Committee on Congressional Operations, working in conjunction with the
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Senate Rule XXV charges the
Senate committee with the duty of identifying "any court proceeding or action
which, in the opinion of the Committee, is of vital interest to the Congress as a
constitutionally established institution of the Federal Government and [of]
call[ing] such proceeding or action to the attention of the Senate."157
When the House decided to discontinue the Select Committee, the House
Judiciary Committee inherited the responsibility for producing Court Proceed-
ings and Actions of Vital Interest to the Congress. These reports are extraordina-
rily helpful in following litigation on such issues as the speech or debate clause,
the congressional investigative power, disputed elections, constitutional qualifi-
cations of members of Congress, and congressional access to executive branch
information, as well as the litigation efforts of individual members of Congress.
In addition to providing a history of legal disputes that reach the courts, Court
Proceedings and Actions of Vital Interest to the Congress reprints the full deci-
sions, many of which are not reported elsewhere.
151. Mikva, supra note 1, at 609.
152. S. KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 144 (1965).
153. Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140 (1970).
154. S. REP. No. 1414, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1966).
155. Pub. L. No. 91-510, § 402(a)(2), 84 Stat. 1140, 1187 (1970).
156. Id. § 402(c).
157. S. Doc. No. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1984).
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In recent years members of Congress have become concerned about the
refusal of the Justice Department to defend the constitutionality of certain statu-
tory provisions. The Department has taken this position in cases in which it
believed that a statute infringed on presidential power1 58 or was so patently un-
constitutional that it could not be defended.' 59 As a result of language placed in
authorization acts for the Justice Department, the Attorney General now must
report to Congress whenever the Department does not intend to defend the con-
stitutionality of a law passed by Congress.16 These reports must specify the
statutory provision and explain why the Department regards it as
unconstitutional.
Congress always has been able to hire private counsel to defend itself, as it
did in the civil action brought against it by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell
in the 1960s. 161 There was no established procedure for Congress to defend its
statutes, however, when the Justice Department chose not to. The institutional
interests of Congress, as noted by the Senate Committee on Governmental Af-
fairs in 1977, made it "inappropriate as a matter of principle and of the constitu-
tional separation of powers for the legislative branch to rely'upon and entrust
the defense of its vital constitutional powers to the advocate for the executive
branch, the Attorney General."' 162 The committee recalled that in both Doe v.
McMillanI63 and Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,1' which in-
volved investigative powers of Congress, the Justice Department withdrew its
representation of Congress just as the litigation reached the Supreme Court. 165
As part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,166 the Senate established
the Office of Senate Legal Counsel. 167 The Senate Legal Counsel and the Dep-
uty Legal Counsel are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate
from recommendations submitted by the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders.
Appointments become effective upon approval by resolution of the Senate.'
6 8
The principal duty of the Counsel is to defend the Senate or a committee, sub-
committee, member, officer, or employee of the Senate when so directed by
either a two-thirds vote of the members of the Joint Leadership Group or by the
adoption of a Senate resolution. The Joint Leadership Group consists of the
Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate, the President pro tempore, and
the chairman and ranking minority member from the Judiciary and the Rules
158. See, eg., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). The Supreme Court invited Senator
George Wharton Pepper to represent Congress as amicus curiae. Id. at 56-57.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Representation of Congress and Con-
gressional Interests in Court, Hearings Before the Senate Comr. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1976).
160. Pub. L. No. 96-132, §21, 93 Stat. 1040, 1049-50 (1979) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 519 note
(1982)).
161. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
162. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1977).
163. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
164. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
165. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1977).
166. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1875 (1978) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 288 (1982)).
167. The Office of Senate Legal Counsel consists of four attorneys and a small support staff.
168. 2 U.S.C. § 288(a)(3)(A) (1982).
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and Administration Committees of the Senate. 169 When directed by Senate res-
olution, the Counsel may bring a civil action to enforce a subpoena issued by the
Senate, or by a Senate committee or subcommittee, or intervene or appear as
amicus curiae in cases involving the powers and responsibilities of Congress.17
0
In the House of Representatives, the office of the Clerk of the House handles
litigation that involves House members, officers, and staff. Decisions to litigate
are made by a bipartisan leadership committee.' 71 Legal work is done by three
attorneys in the office of the Clerk of the House, and is supported by outside
consultants.
Members of Congress also have access to other sources of legal assistance.
CQngressional hearings attract testimony from administration witnesses, consti-
tutional scholars, and representatives of various private organizations. Commit-
tee staff can analyze constitutional questions and call on the American Law
Division of the Library of Congress, which is staffed with approximately fifty
attorneys specializing in different subject areas. The Office of the Legislative
Counsel of the House and the Office of the Legislative Counsel of the Senate,
established to assist members in drafting bills and resolutions, also provide con-
stitutional advice.172 The General Accounting Office (GAO) has approximately
140 attorneys in its Office of General Counsel, but the GAO generally regards it
as inappropriate to question the constitutionality of a statute unless the Supreme
Court already has ruled on the constitutionality of a similar piece of
legislation.
173
Another striking development over the past decade is the frequency with
which members of Congress have turned to the courts for assistance. During the
impoundment disputes of the Nixon Administration, members submitted an
amicus curiae brief on behalf of plaintiffs suing the Administration. 174 In the
abortion funding case eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1980, the
district court permitted Senators James Buckley and Jesse Helms and Congress-
man Henry Hyde to intervene as defendants.1 7 5 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invited both the House and the Senate to submit
briefs concerning a legislative veto used by Congress in deportation matters. 176
When the case reached the Supreme Court, both Houses of Congress had inter-
vened to protect their institutional interests and fully participated before the
Court. The attorneys for Congress defended the legislative veto, but in a sepa-
rate brief nine members of the House urged the Supreme Court to declare the
169. Id. § 288a.
170. Id. §§ 288b-288e.
171. See 2 Legislative Branch Appropriations for 1985: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (1984).
172. 2 U.S.C. §§ 271-282e (1982). There are approximately 17 attorneys in the Senate office and
approximately 35 in the House office.
173. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIA-
TIONS LAW 1-7 (June 1982); Letter from Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General, to Congress-
man Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, July 26, 1984.
174. State Highway Comm'n of Mo. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 n.I (8th Cir. 1973).
175. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 303 (1980).
176. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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legislative veto unconstitutional.
177
Senator Edward Kennedy was successful at both the district court and the
appellate court level in challenging President Nixon's attempt to use the "pocket
veto" during brief recesses of the House and Senate. 178 Kennedy succeeded be-
cause his prerogative to vote to override a presidential veto had been denied by
the pocket veto. Other members of Congress, however, have been unsuccessful
when they have tried to achieve political goals in the courts rather than through
the regular legislative process. In such cases the members have been told by the
courts that they lack standing to sue, the issue is not ripe for adjudication, or the
matter is a "political question" to be decided by Congress and the President.
179
A legislator must overcome those standing hurdles-faced by any litigant-by
showing that (1) he has suffered injury, (2) the interests are within the zone
protected by the statute or constitutional provision, (3) the injury is caused by
the challenged action, and (4) the injury can be redressed by a favorable court
action 80 Legislators, however, face an additional obstacle: if they suffer from
an injury that can be redressed by their colleagues acting through the regular
legislative process, a court may exercise "equitable discretion" and dismiss the
action. 1
81
These cases reflect a general wariness on the part of judges that the contro-
versy actually is not between Congress and the President, but instead is a dispute
between opposing groups of legislators. Federal judges may suspect that mem-
bers of Congress turn to the courts because they have been unable to attract
enough votes to pass a bill. Thus, when legislators fail to make use of the reme-
dies available within Congress, they have been denied standing to resolve the
issue in court.
18 2
III. THREE CASE STUDIES
Judge Mikva examined three recent efforts by Congress to engage in consti-
tutional deliberation: the 1974 extension of minimum wages to employees of
state and local governments, the Senate's adoption in 1982 of a legislative veto
for agency rulemaking, and the provision in the 1970 Organized Crime Control
Act allowing increased sentences for dangerous special offenders on appellate
177. Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Certain Members of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives, amicus curiae, INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, 80-2171,
filed January 8, 1982).
178. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974), affgg 364 F. Supp. 1075 (D.D.C.
1973).
179. Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1632 (1977).
180. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13 (4th ed. 1983).
181. See, eg., Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 454
U.S. 1082 (1981); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204-05 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Goldwater v. Carter,
481 F. Supp. 949, 951 (D.D.C. 1979).
182. See, eg., Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 997
(1978); Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrington v. Schles-
inger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974); see
also McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241 (1981) (Supreme
Court also relies on ripeness and political question doctrines; author suggests expansion of use of
discretion as alternative).
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review. According to Judge Mikva, the three examples "raise questions con-
cerning Congress' ability to make constitutional judgments and its role as guard-
ian of the Constitution." 183 While admitting that the three examples are not
"exhaustive," Judge Mikva views them as "good illustrations of Congress' rela-
tionship with the Constitution." 184 A review of the three case studies reveals
that they do not call into question Congress' ability to make constitutional judg-
ments. Rather, the record suggests that Congress was reasonably informed and
careful in its deliberations. Its judgments compare favorably to those announced
by the courts.
A. The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974
The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974185 extended the minimum
wage level set by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 186 bringing employees of state
and local governments within the reach of the Act. Before 1974 federal law
defined "employer" to include "any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the
United States or any State or political subdivision of a State. .... ,"187 The 1974
Amendments deleted the language beginning with "but shall."188 Two years
later the Supreme Court in National League of Cities v. Usery,189 a case it has
since overruled, 190 invalidated the extension as unconstitutional because it "di-
rectly displace[d] the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions .. 191
The Court's decision, Judge Mikva noted, "came as a complete surprise to
Congress. What little constitutional discussion there had been in Congress had
centered on whether it was appropriate to invoke the commerce power to extend
the Fair Labor Standards Act to governmental employees." 192 The Senate La-
bor and Public Welfare Committee concluded that the activities of public sector
employees affected interstate commerce and therefore justified the extension of
minimum wages to state and local employees.1 93 Congress also assumed that
the Supreme Court had settled the issue in Maryland v. Wirtz, 194 a case which
had upheld by an eight-to-one vote an extension of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to employees of hospitals and schools operated by state and local
governments.
Judge Mikva is correct that National League of Cities came as a "complete
183. Mikva, supra note 1, at 590.
184. Id. at 591.
185. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 202-208, 210, 212-214, 216,
255, 260 (1982)).
186. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 255, 260 (1982).
187. Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (1938).
188. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88 Stat. 55, 58 (1974).
189. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
190. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
191. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
192. Mikva, supra note 1, at 591.
193. S. REP. No. 690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1974).
194. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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surprise" to members of Congress. It also came as a surprise to constitutional
scholars and to the four dissenting Justices. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
White and Marshall, stated that "[i]t must. . . be surprising that my Brethren
should choose this bicentennial year of our independence to repudiate principles
governing judicial interpretation of our Constitution settled since the time of
Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall . ... 195 Justice Brennan could not recall
another instance in the Court's history when the reasoning of so many
decisions covering so long a span of time has been discarded in such a
roughshod manner. That this is done without any justification not al-
ready often advanced and consistently rejected, clearly renders today's
decision an ipse dixit reflecting nothing but displeasure with a congres-
sional judgment. 
196
Justice Stevens' separate dissent remarked that the "principle on which the [ma-
jority's] holding rests is difficult to perceive."
19 7
In reviewing the legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1974, Judge Mikva stated that it is clear that the line of reasoning in
National League of Cities "was not anticipated" by Congress. 19 8 It also may not
have been anticipated by anyone else. National League of Cities has not
strengthened the cause of federalism when Congress acts under its enforcement
powers pursuant to the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, 199 and it appears
that the decision was little more than an aberrant holding that since has been
reversed.
The important issue is not the failure of Congress to anticipate National
League of Cities, but rather the subsequent decisions that foretold that the rule
in National League of Cities would be overturned and Congress' initial constitu-
tional interpretation would prevail. In EEOC v. Wyoming,2° ° a federal district
court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act violated the tenth
amendment theory articulated in National League of Cities.20 1 Justice Brennan,
writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, reversed the judgment of the dis-
trict court. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the only basis
for questioning the age discrimination statute
is the pure judicial fiat found in this Court's opinion in National
League of Cities v. Usery. Neither the Tenth Amendment, nor any
other provision of the Constitution, affords any support for that judi-
cially constructed limitation on the scope of the federal power granted
to Congress by the Commerce Clause.20 2
Justice Stevens' opinion implied that National League of Cities deserved to be
195. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 871-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Mikva, supra note 1, at 593.
199. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-80 (1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976).
200. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
201. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
202. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 248 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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placed in the same category as other decisions repudiated by the Court.
Notwithstanding his respect for the doctrine of stare decisis, he advised that
"the law would be well served by a prompt rejection of National League of Cit-
ies' modem embodiment of the spirit of the Articles of Confederation.1
20 3
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court accepted a case that eventually re-
versed National League of Cities.2° 4 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,20 5 the Court asked the parties to brief and argue the following
question: "Whether or not the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth
in National League of Cities v. Usery. . .should be reconsidered?" 20 6 On Feb-
ruary 19, 1985, a five-to-four decision by the Supreme Court overturned the
ruling in National League of Cities.20 7 Justice Blackmun authored the Opinion
of the Court in Garcia that negated the National League of Cities majority opin-
ion, with which he had concurred less than ten years before.
B. The Legislative Veto
Judge Mikva cited four constitutional challenges to the reliance by Con-
gress on legislative vetoes: the doctrine of separation of powers, the requirement
of bicameral action by Congress, the presentment clause of the Constitution, and
excessive delegation of legislative power. 208 With regard to the first point, he
argued that through the use of the legislative veto to control delegated power,
"Congress intrudes upon the executive branch and begins to exercise administra-
tive discretion. Because the veto procedure circumvents the executive, Con-
gress, in effect, makes the President a subordinate. ' 20 9 This latter statement
does not take into account several features of the legislative veto that make Con-
gress, in effect, subordinate to the President. A review of the origin of the legis-
lative veto reveals its many-sided character.
The legislative veto emerged in the 1930s as a technique for reconciling two
conflicting needs. Executive officials wanted to broaden their discretionary au-
thority and avoid the limitations of the full statutory process. Members of Con-
gress consented only on the condition that they could retain a control
mechanism that would not require passage of a public law. Both branches
wanted shortcuts. The resulting accommodation permitted Presidents and ad-
ministrators to make proposals that would become law within a stated period
unless Congress disapproved by a one-house or two-house veto. Because Con-
gress would be acting by a simple resolution or a concurrent resolution, the
203. Id. at 250 (Stevens, J., concurring).
204. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on October 3, 1983. 52 U.S.L.W. 3261
(1983), the same year in which the EEOC v. Wyoming decision was rendered. The Court accepted
the case directly from the district court. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557
F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Auth., 105 S.
Ct. 1005 (1985).
205. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
206. 52 U.S.L.W. 3937 (1984). For oral argument on reconsideration of National League of
Cities, see 53 U.S.L.W. 3255 (1984).
207. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007.
208. Mikva, supra note 1, at 593-94.
209. Id. at 593.
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resolution would not go back to the President for his signature or veto. As it
evolved, the legislative veto included requirements for congressional approval as
well as disapproval and vested some of the controls in congressional
committees.
2 10
This procedure obviously departed from the customary procedure of having
Congress pass a bill and present it to the President.2 11 It is not true, however,
that Congress arbitrarily imposed an unconstitutional process on a reluctant
President in an effort to make him a subordinate. Congress never claimed that it
could exercise control over the President simply by passing one-house and two-
house vetoes. Such a procedure clearly violates the presentment clause. A dif-
ferent issue arises, however, when the use of legislative vetoes is sanctioned by a
prior public law. As far back as 1854, the Attorney General had recognized that
the legislative effect of simple or concurrent resolutions would be changed fun-
damentally if authorized by law. Attorney General Cushing stated that a simple
resolution could not coerce a department head
unless in some particular in which a law, duly enacted, has subjected
him to the direct action of each [House]; and in such case it is to be
intended, that, by approving the law, the President has consented to
the exercise of such coerciveness on the part of either House.
2 12
In the view of the Attorney General, there was nothing unconstitutional about
departing from a strict reading of the legislative procedure if both branches
agreed. The departure had to be mutually satisfactory, and for much of our
history it was.
The record of the legislative veto is replete with such accommodations. The
early forms of the legislative veto clearly favored the President. Congress gave
President Hoover authority to reorganize executive agencies; his proposals
would take effect as law within sixty days unless either house disapproved.
2 13
Although the House of Representatives subsequently rejected all of Hoover's
reorganization proposals, 2 14 the procedure was highly beneficial to the Presi-
dent. Hoover did not have to secure the support of both Houses as required by
the regular legislative process. Instead, the burden was placed on Congress to
prevent his plans from taking effect. Although the constitutional process was
turned on its head, the advantage fell essentially to the President, not to Con-
gress. Moreover, other expedited features served the interests of the President.
Hoover's proposals could not be buried in committee, filibustered, or amended
by Congress, either in committee or on the floor. Members of Congress were
limited to a yes-or-no vote.
21 5
210. See L. FISHER, supra note 10, at 162-64.
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
212. 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 680, 683 (1854).
213. Pub. L. No. 72-212, 47 Stat. 382, 413-15 (1932).
214. See 76 CONG. Rac. 2125-26 (1933). For details on the history of reorganization authority,
see Fisher & Moe, Delegating With Ambivalence" The Legislative Veto and Reorganization Authority,
in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE
VETO 164-247 (Comm. Print 1980).
215. See Pub. L. No. 72-212, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 413 (1932).
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The prohibition on congressional amendments demonstrates that Congress
was sensitive to constitutional requirements. If Congress had been able to
amend Hoover's proposals without returning the amended versions to the Presi-
dent for his signature or veto, the legislative process would have been subverted.
Congress could have made "new law" without presidential participation. Under
the reorganization statutes, however, Presidents retained exclusive control over
the content of reorganization plans.
216
Constitutional issues also were debated carefully in the late 1930s after
President Roosevelt asked Congress to renew the authority to reorganize execu-
tive agencies. He insisted that the only constitutional form of congressional dis-
approval would be by bill or joint resolution. Action by simple or concurrent
resolution, he believed, would not be legally binding.2 17 Members of the House
of Representatives refused to delegate reorganization authority if they could
maintain control only by passing a bill or joint resolution, either of which the
President could veto. They did not want to be required to produce extraordi-
nary majorities in each House to override vetoes and maintain control over dele-
gated power.
Both branches then sought an accommodation that respected the needs of
the President and Congress. To receive the authority he wanted, Roosevelt ac-
cepted congressional action by concurrent resolution. Both branches agreed
that any attempt by Congress to use concurrent resolutions to control past laws
would be unconstitutional. It would be permissible, however, for Congress to
use a two-house disapproval over a reorganization proposal, which was called a
law "in the making.1218 Defeat of a reorganization proposal would merely pre-
serve the status quo, leaving the structure of government unchanged. This com-
promise satisfied both branches until 1982, when the Justice Department advised
the Supreme Court that it no longer accepted as constitutional the legislative
veto in reorganization statutes.2 19 It took fifty years for the Justice Department
to oppose the legislative veto in all its forms, and then only under the realization
that it was intellectually inconsistent to support the legislative veto in the reor-
ganization statutes2 20 while condemning all others.
Whatever legal misgivings Presidents may have had about the legislative
veto in reorganization acts, they did not acquiesce in the spirit of subserviency.
They acquiesced because it was to their advantage. Presidents who wanted the
authority took the conditions that went with it. The Nixon Administration, for
example, never uttered a word of protest when the Impoundment Control Act of
216. Legislation passed in 1977 allowed amendments to reorganization plans, but only those
amendments submitted by the President. Pub. L. No. 95-17, § 903(c), 91 Stat. 29, 31 (1977) (codi-
fied at 5 U.S.C. 904 (1982)).
217. 83 CONG. REc. 4487 (1938).
218. Id. at 5004-05.
219. Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service at 58 n.37, INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct.
2764 (1983).
220. See 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10 (Jan. 31, 1977) (Attorney General Griffin Bell's strained
effort to distinguish the legislative veto in the reorganization statute from other types of legislative
vetoes).
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1974221 authorized the President to defer the spending of funds subject to a one-
house veto. It wanted the authority and accepted the condition, in part to avoid
the dreary round of defeats it had suffered in the federal courts. No one in the
Ford, Carter, or Reagan Administrations ever suggested that the one-house veto
over deferrals was in any sense unconstitutional.
Congress added a legislative veto to the War Powers Resolution of 1973.222
To argue that this statutory provision made the President subservient to Con-
gress would overlook the series of unilateral actions taken by Presidents Johnson
and Nixon to widen the war in Southeast Asia. While a member of Congress,
Mikva wrote a law review article in which he urged Congress to place statutory
constraints on the President's ability to make war.2 23 As a tool for reining in
the President, he looked with particular hope to the power of the purse as em-
bodied in the Cooper-Church Amendment. 224 His article appeared in 1971,
before Congress had begun to consider seriously a legislative veto to accommo-
date legislative-executive interests in the war power area.
The legislative veto was adopted after Congress met frustration in its
power-of-the-purse efforts. Members tried to stop the war in the spring of 1973
by cutting off funds, but they discovered that a majority in each House was
insufficient leverage to control the President. President Nixon vetoed the bill
and Congress failed to override.22 5 Did this inability to override the veto consti-
tute implicit approval of the President's policy? District Judge Judd said that
"[lt cannot be the rule that the President needs a vote of only one-third plus one
of either House in order to conduct a war, but this would be the consequence of
holding that Congress must override a Presidential veto in order to terminate
hostilities which it has not authorized. '22 6 Thus, the purpose of the legislative
veto in the War Powers Resolution was to prevent Presidents from conducting
wars with only minority backing from Congress.
Arms sales, subject to a two-house veto, represent another area that relied
on a legislative veto to accommodate the competing interests of Congress and
the President. During a briefing in 1978, Attorney General Griffin Bell was
asked if President Carter would feel bound if Congress, by concurrent resolu-
tion, vetoed his Mideast arms sales package. Bell replied:
He would not be bound in our view, but we have to have comity be-
tween the branches of government, just as we have between nations.
And under a spirit of comity, we could abide by it, and there would be
nothing wrong with abiding by it. We don't have to have a confronta-
tion every time we can.227
221. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 332 (1974).
222. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
223. Mikva & Lundy, The 91st Congress and the Constitution, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 449, 485-97
(1971).
224. Id. at 487. The Cooper-Church Amendment established a number of restrictions on the use
of American military force in Cambodia. See id. at 486 n.107 (text of amendment).
225. L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 114-17 (1975).
226. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
227. Office of the White House Secretary, Briefing by Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, Stuart K
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White House adviser Stuart Eizenstat added:
I think the point the Judge [Bell] is making is that we don't concede
the constitutionality of any of [the legislative vetoes] yet, but that as a
matter of comity with certain of these issues where we think the Con-
gress has a legitimate interest, such as the War Powers Act, as a matter
of comity, we are willing to forego the specific legal challenge and
abide by that judgment because we think it is such an overriding
issue.
228
The legislative veto began as an accommodation between the branches.
There was never any question of one branch becoming subservient to another.
When the basis for that accommodation started to erode in the 1970s, the legis-
lative veto had run its course. The collapse of the agreement, however, does not
justify the sweeping language of the decisions of the courts of appeals 229 and the
Supreme Court.230 Apparently Judge Mikva would agree. In one of the deci-
sions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
decided about six months before the Supreme Court's ruling in INS v.
Chadha,231 Judge Mikva expressed concern about the broad nature of his
court's rulings on the legislative veto. In a joint statement with Judge Wald, he
asked the court to rehear a legislative veto case en banc:
[V]itally important issues of executive-legislative relations are articu-
lated too broadly and explored inadequately in the panel opinion. We
are especially concerned that the panel's opinion lumps together for
automatic rejection under the rubric of "legislative vetoes" several dif-
ferent kinds of statutory provisions, each entailing a distinct accommo-
dation between the executive and legislative branches. Such black-
and-white treatment of these statutes ignores a largely gray area that
has existed for 200 years in our constitutional scheme ...
We write separately to underscore our concern that language in
the panel's opinion not be read to foreclose careful consideration in
subsequent cases of historical experience, practical working relation-
ships, and the deference due Congress when it establishes its own pro-
cedures under the Constitution. . . . We are convinced that [the one-
house vetoes in the Reorganization Act and the Impoundment Control
Act] cannot simply be invalidated under the reasoning of our prior
opinions without detailed examination of how such arrangements op-
erate and what they are designed to accomplish. 232
After the Supreme Court decided Chadha, Judge Mikva testified before a Senate
Eizenstat, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy, and John Harmon, Office of
Legal Counsel, June 21, 1978, at 4.
228. Id.
229. AFGE v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Consumers Union, Inc. v.
FrC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
230. INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
231. Id.
232. AFGE v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Mikva, J., statement concerning
denial of rehearing en banc).
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committee on the virtues of the legislative veto and the defects of the Court's
ruling:
I understand and respect the need for the legislative veto, and I am
here to extoll its virtues rather than to criticize its excesses, although I
must say that I saw both while I was in the Congress.
I think that the Supreme Court decision is unfortunate
I think that the Supreme Court overwrote Chadha. I think
that they used their pen too broadly in trying to reach at the excesses
and took away not only a necessary tool to the legislative process, but,
indeed, wrote in a way that simply cannot be enforced. . . . [T]he
court restrained the form in which the Congress may exercise the leg-
islative veto, but the Court did not and cannot get at the substance, not
unless it strikes down all of article I as unconstitutional.
2 33
This Article is not the place for a detailed critique of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Chadha. The author is unaware of any law review article that could be
considered complimentary of the Court's reasoning or its understanding of mod-
em government and the legislative process. 234 Over a period of decades, the
level of debate within Congress was far more sophisticated and insightful on the
constitutional issue than the simplistic and formalistic position of the Supreme
Court. The level of constitutional analysis in Chadha scarcely overshadows the
efforts of Congress over the preceding fifty years. Congress may have gone too
far with the legislative veto--especially with the determination to apply it to all
agency rules and regulations-but the underlying arguments in favor of this con-
gressional tool were responsible and well informed. Congress took into account,
far better than the Court, the complex factors involved in governing an adminis-
trative state, the large-scale delegations of legislative power to the executive
branch, and the need for executive-legislative cooperation.
The Chadha Court's misreading of history and congressional procedures
will yield some strange results; its theory of government is too much at odds
with the practices developed over a half century. Few administrators or legisla-
tors will want the static model advanced by the Court. The conditions that
spawned the legislative veto in the 1930s have not disappeared. Executive offi-
cials still want substantial latitude in administering delegated authority; legisla-
tors still insist on retaining control without having to pass another law. After
Chadha, congressional committees will continue to use informal and nonstatu-
tory methods to control administrative actions by the executive branch. Agen-
cies are allowed some flexibility to shift funds through the "reprogramming"
process, provided they obtain the approval of designated committees.235 Be-
cause these "gentlemen's agreements" generally are not placed in statutes, they
233. Constitutional Amendment to Restore Legislative Veto: Hearings Before the Senate Comm
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1984).
234. For some detailed critiques, see L. FISHER, supra note 10, at 178-83; Elliott, INS v. Chadha:
The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SuP. Cr. REv. 125;
Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto
Decision, 1983 DuKE L.. 789.
235. L. FISHER, supra note 225, at 75-98.
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are unaffected by the Court's decision. They are not legal in effect; they are,
however, in effect legal.
Not surprisingly, Congress has continued to place legislative vetoes in bills
presented to the President. Despite Chadha, they are signed into law. 236 In the
first sixteen months after Chadha, Congress enacted eighteen bills incorporating
fifty-three legislative vetoes.237 Because of the accommodations needed for con-
temporary government, agencies can be expected to comply with these legisla-
tive vetoes, which are generally of the committee variety. One unfortunate
result of the Court's decision is that it promises a form of government that does
not and cannot prevail.
Judge Mikva objects to the Senate's adoption in 1982 of the Schmitt
Amendment, which would have applied the legislative veto to all agency rules.
Senator Schmitt, however, did what Judge Mikva apparently would like all
members to do. Schmitt made his own judgment-a favorable one--on the con-
stitutionality of the legislative veto, notwithstanding contrary rulings by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.2 38 As
Judge Mikva noted, the Senators in favor of the Schmitt amendment "went to
great lengths to assert the need for Congress to make its own judgments of
constitutionality. 239
On the other hand, Senators Leahy and Danforth opposed the Schmitt
Amendment by arguing "the pendency of the issue before the Supreme Court, as
well as the D.C. Circuit decision in a very similar case that resolved the constitu-
tional doubts against the veto provision. . ".."240 Both Senators wished to defer
to the courts for a resolution. Senator Danforth stated that Congress
is not the forum for debating the issue of constitutionality of the legis-
lative veto. The fact of the matter is that it is irrelevant whether we
debate it in the Senate, the issue is going to be decided one way or
another by the Supreme Court of the United States. . . . [L]et us wait
for the Supreme Court to speak.241
The positions taken by Senators Leahy and Danforth seem contrary to
Judge Mikva's model of a responsible Congress. First, the two Senators were
willing to pass the issue to the courts, which "is both an abdication of [the con-
gressional] role as a constitutional guardian and an abnegation of its duty of
responsible lawmaking."242 Second, they based their conclusions not on in-
dependent analysis but on what courts had done or were likely to do. As Judge
Mikva advised, "[a]cting like a lower federal court is certainly not what Jeffer-
son envisioned for Congress; Congress should be able to make its own decisions
236. Rothman, Despite High Court Ruling, Legislative Vetoes Abound, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.,
July 21, 1984, at 1797-98.
237. The author's survey of this legislation is on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
238. AFGE v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Consumers Union, Inc. v.
FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
239. Mikva, supra note I, at 600.
240. 1d. at 598.
241. Id. at 599 n.61 (citing 128 CONG Rac. S2596 (daily ed. March 23, 1982)).
242. Id. at 610.
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rather than having to predict what the Supreme Court would do .... ,,243
C. Section 3576 of the Organized Crime Control Act
As part of an effort to counter the tendency of some trial judges to mete out
light sentences in cases involving organized crime, Congress passed Title X of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.244 Section 3576 allowed appellate
courts to review and increase sentences. 245 According to Judge Mikva, the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill to the floor "without any con-
stitutional hesitations." 246 It is difficult to probe the minds of committee
members to discover whether they harbored any doubts or misgivings, but the
committee report contains extensive analysis of the constitutional question of
appellate review of sentences. 247 The committee considered both due process
and double jeopardy. Based on available court decisions, the Justice Depart-
ment concluded that "it would seem that if these cases are still good law today
then the Government should be able to seek an increase in sentence on appeal
without violating either due process or the Fifth Amendment ban on double
jeopardy."
24 8
The Senate committee therefore was aware that authority existed to support
both sides of the question, but that, on balance, section 3576 appeared to be
constitutional. To avoid due process problems, the committee adopted a
number of procedural limitations on the right of the government to appeal a
sentence.249 That left the question of double jeopardy. Judge Mikva noted that
the committee relied heavily on the testimony of the Department of Justice and
Professor Peter Low.250 Professor Low was not merely an academic; he was the
reporter of the American Bar Association study on sentencing. 25 1 Moreover, in
1964 the United States Judicial Conference had "discussed fully and approved a
bill to empower Federal appellate courts to increase or decrease lawful but inad-
equate or excessive sentences."
'252
Judge Mikva recalled his opposition to the bill during his service as a con-
gressman from Illinois. He and two colleagues wrote dissenting views in the
report issued by the House Judiciary Committee. Among their arguments, re-
printed in Judge Mikva's article, were the following comments:
Title X, were it not such a dangerous special offender itself, would be
ludicrous, the product of a caveman's course on the Constitution. As
it is, it contravenes the Constitution, it substitutes revenge for reason,
243. Id. at 607.
244. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title
18 of the United States Code).
245. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1982) (appellate courts may increase a sentence only if the United States
"takes review").
246. Mikva, supra note 1, at 601.
247. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 92-100 (1969).
248. Id. at 93.
249. See id. at 166-67.
250. Mikva, supra note 1, at 601.
251. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 98 (1969).
252. Id. at 99.
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and it flaunts the concept of fair treatment. It is [a] parody of justice
made tragic by the damage it will do-to individuals, and more impor-
tant, to our system of rule by law.
2 53
A review of the Senate and House reports2 54 does not support the image of a
caveman's course on the Constitution; legal authorites are cited and analyzed.
In contrast, the comments by Congressman Mikva and his two colleagues seem
too rhetorical:
This bill is another dreary episode in the ponderous assault on free-
dom. . . . [I]t is more likely to catch poachers and prostitutes than it
is to catch pushers and pimps. . . . [I]t rips off large chunks of the
Constitution. . . . [It is] a repressive shotgun which shoots down in-
nocent and guilty with equal diffidence.
255
If the House and Senate Judiciary Committees behaved like cavemen, the
Supreme Court apparently belongs in the same category. In North Carolina v.
Pearce,256 decided a year before Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control
Act, the Court decided that there was no constitutional bar to imposing a more
severe sentence on reconviction. The guarantee against double jeopardy, how-
ever, would be violated "when punishment already exacted for an offense is not
fully 'credited' in imposing sentence upon a new conviction of the same of-
fense." 2 57 Pearce dealt with the imposition of sentences after a new trial and
reconviction;258 section 3576 involved increases in existing sentences.
25 9
The precise features of section 3576 came before the Court in United States
v. DiFrancesco,260 which upheld the provision by a five-to-four vote. Although
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy prohibits a second trial fol-
lowing an acquittal,261 the double jeopardy clause "is not a complete barrier to
an appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case."'2 62 The Court stated that, his-
torically, "the pronouncement of sentence has never carried the finality that at-
taches to an acquittal. '2 63 The Court cited studies indicating that sentencing is
one of the areas of the criminal justice system most in need of reform, referring
to Judge Frankel's observation that the basic problem of the present system is
"'the unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory.' "264
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, pointed out that appellate review "cre-
ates a check upon this unlimited power, and should lead to a greater degree of
253. Mikva, supra note 1, at 603 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1970)),
254. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1969).
255. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1970).
256. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
257. Id. at 718.
258. Id. at 722.
259. 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1982).
260. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
261. Id. at 129.
262. Id. at 132.
263. Id. at 133.
264. Id. at 142-43 (quoting M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrrHOUT ORDER 49
(1973)).
[V/ol. 63
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION
consistency in sentencing. '2 65 When Congress passed legislation in 1984 to pro-
vide more systematic guidelines on sentencing, 266 the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee stated that it was "an anomaly to provide for appellate correction of
prejudicial trial errors and not to provide for appellate correction of incorrect or
unreasonable sentences." 267 The committee reinforced Judge ]Frankel's views
on the fairness issue:
It is clearly desirable, in the interest of reducing unwarranted sen-
tence disparity, to permit the government, on behalf of the public, to
appeal and have increased a sentence that is below the applicable
guideline and that is found to be unreasonable. If only the defendant
could appeal his sentence, there would be no effective opportunity for
the reviewing courts to correct the injustice arising from a sentence
that was patently too lenient. . . .The unequal availability of appel-
late review, moreover, would have a tendency to skew the system,
since if appellate review were a one-way street, so that the tribunal
could only reduce excessive sentences but not enhance inadequate
ones, then the effort to achieve greater consistency might well result in
a gradual scaling down of sentences to the level of the-most lenient
ones. Certainly the development of a principled and balanced body of
appellate case law would be severly hampered.
268
Judge Mikva felt that the constitutional support of the Senate and the
House for section 3576 may have convinced the Court that "in part . . its
work had been done already. '269 He stated that in DiFrancesco the Court "was
faced not only with the task of deciding a constitutional question, but also with
the problem of confronting Congress if it disagreed with the legislation." 270
What was the alternative? Would it have been better for members of Congress
to remain silent on the constitutional issue, keeping the slate clean for calm and
undistracted judicial deliberation? Such conduct would expose members to
Judge Mikva's charge that they irresponsibly pass the tough constitutional issues
to the courts. Furthermore, the development of constitutional law provides
strong evidence that the judiciary derives essential guidance from interpretations
previously adopted by the legislative and executive branches.
IV. CONCLUSION
The interests of constituional law and the political process are served best
when members of Congress form independent judgments on constitutional is-
sues. Most of these issues are within the capability of members, whether they
have legal training or not. Constitutional issues often turn not so much on tech-
nical legal points but on a balancing of competing political and social values.
Collisions occur between congressional regulation and federalism, state rights
265. Id. at 143.
266. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 213, 98 Stat. 1837, 2011 (1984).
267. S. REp. No. 223, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 147 (1983).
268. Id. at 148.
269. Mikva, supra note 1, at 605.
270. Id.
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and civil rights, government regulation and individual privacy, free press and
fair trial, congressional investigation and executive privilege, and other questions
of priorities. Congress has adequate resources to analyze these constitutional
issues. Although members should form their judgments with an awareness of
what courts have decided, no need exists to follow those rulings in mechanical
fashion. That a congressional interpretation or understanding of the Constitu-
tion may differ from the Court's is hardly reason to conclude that Congress
ignores the Constitution-a charge that imputes legislative bad faith.
Even after courts hand down a decision, there are opportunities for Con-
gress to test the soundness of the decision by passing new legislation and sup-
porting further litigation. The history of child labor legislation offers a striking
example. The first child labor law passed by Congress was based on the com-
merce power. The Supreme Court invalidated that statute in 1918.271 The sec-
ond congressional attempt, based on the taxing power, was invalidated in a 1922
decision. 27 2 Congress then passed a constitutional amendment in 1924, which
would have given it the power to regulate child labor. By 1937, however, only
twenty-eight of the necessary thirty-six states had ratified the amendment. On
its final effort, Congress returned to the commerce power by including a child
labor provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.273 This time the Court
upheld the statute.274
Another example of congressional independence concerns the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.275 Basing this statute solely on the fourteenth amendment would
have risked a head-on collision with The Civil Rights Cases27 6 of 1883, which
never had been overruled. Congress chose the commerce power as an alterna-
tive constitutional foundation for the Civil Rights Act,2 7 7 and the Supreme
Court upheld the Act by finding in the commerce power sufficient congressional
authority.278
Congressional-Court dialogues need not consume decades before Congress
alters the shape of a Supreme Court decision. Title II of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968279 modified three controversial Court rul-
ings on criminal procedure. The first, Mallory v. United States,280 held that sus-
pects must be taken before a magistrate for arraignment as quickly as
possible.28 1 Additionally, admissions obtained from the suspect during illegal
detainment could not be used against him. The Court made room for congres-
sional involvement by basing its decision not solely on constitutional grounds,
271. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
272. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
273. Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 12, 52 Stat. 1060, 1067 (1938).
274. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
275. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
276. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
277. D. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 292-330.
278. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
279. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
280. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
281. Id. at 454.
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but also on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure enacted by Congress. 28 2
The decision thus invited Congress to enter the arena and modify those rules.
Congress did so: Title II established six hours as a reasonable period before
arraignment. 28 3 Congressional action was justified as a modification of the Fed-
eral Rules.of Criminal Procedure even though constitutional issues clearly were
present.
In the second case, Miranda v. Arizona,284 the Court held that confessions
by criminal suspects could not be used unless the suspects had been informed of
their rights by law enforcement officers.285 It is unclear whether the majority
opinion was based on constitutional principles or statutory rules of evidence.
The Court reviewed the history of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination,28 6 spoke of the "constitutional issue we decide in each of these
cases," 287 and stated that "the issues presented are of constitutional dimensions
and must be determined by the courts. '288 The Court also referred to the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure2 8 9 and invited Congress to contribute its own
handiwork. 290 Congress did so again: Title II allowed for the admissibility of
confessions if voluntarily given.291 Trial judges would determine the issue of
voluntariness after taking into consideration all the circumstances surrounding
the confession, including five elements identified by Congress.
292
In the third case, United States v. Wade,293 the Court decided that if an
accused was denied the right to counsel during a police lineup, the identification
would be inadmissible unless the in-court identifications had an independent
source or the introduction of the evidence would be harmless error.2 94 The
Court stated that "[1]egislative or other regulations, such as those developed by
the local police departments, [might] eliminate the risks of abuse and uninten-
tional suggestion at lineup proceedings," but that "neither Congress nor the
Federal authorites have seen fit to provide a solution. ' 295 Title II provided that
eyewitness testimony would be admissible as evidence in any criminal prosecu-
tion, regardless of whether the accused had an attorney present at the lineup.
296
Thus, what appears to be constitutional interpretation by the courts is
sometimes "a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules draw-
ing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitu-
282. Id. at 451.
283. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1982).
284. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
285. Id. at 467-79.
286. Id. at 439-44.
287. Id. at 445.
288. Id. at 490.
289. Id. at 463.
290. Id. at 467.
291. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1982).
292. Id. § 3501(b).
293. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
294. Id. at 239-42.
295. Id. at 239.
296. 18 U.S.C. § 3502.
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tional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law subject to amendment,
modification, or even reversal by Congress. ' 297 When the courts announce
these rules, such as the exclusionary rule or the Miranda rule, they invite Con-
gress to become involved in the continuing process of defining the content of
individual liberties. Congress assumes a coordinate role. These rules lie "at the
margin of constitutional liberties [and] should not be disruptive of a productive
Court-Congress relationship." 298 Through this slow evolution of a constitu-
tional common law, "[c]ongressional debate concerning the means of imple-
menting new-found values may provide the Supreme Court with much-needed
feedback as to the implications, and indeed the propriety, of its activism."
'299
No single institution, including the judiciary, has the final word on consti-
tutional questions. All citizens have a responsibility to take a "hard look" at
what judges decide. It is not true, as Justice Jackson once remarked, that Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court "are not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only because we are final.,,300 The Court is neither final nor infallible.
Judicial decisions rest undisturbed only to the extent that Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the general public find the decisions convincing, reasonable, and
acceptable.
The courts therefore find themselves engaged in what Alexander Bickel
once called a "continuing colloquy" 30 1 with political institutions and society at
large, a process in which constitutional principle is "evolved conversatioially
not perfected unilaterally. '302 It is this process of give and take and mutual
respect that permits the unelected Court to function in a democratic society.
John Agresto argues persuasively that "the more the Court can be treated as a
partner in the politics of American life and not as a superior external agent, the
fewer will be our doubts about its contributions and the greater should be our
willingness to see it exercise its functions without misgivings.
'303
The ability of Congress to participate effectively in constitutional interpre-
tation depends in part on the strength of its committee system, as Judge Mikva
noted. 304 Responsible action also is more likely when Congress can resist pre-
cipitous action under the pressure of deadlines and public opinion. The histori-
cal record suggests that
public excitement and party contentiousness may force measures of
dubious constitutionality or wisdom onto the floor in the last hectic
days of a pre-election session. At such times those seeking immediate
political advantage may overleap all the hurdles which reason, experi-
297. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975).
298. Id. at 34.
299. Id. at 45; see also Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975) (Congress should be able to draw the boundaries of civil rights
protection, consistent with the Constitution.).
300. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
301. A. BiCKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 240, 244 (1962).
302. Id. at 244.
303. J. AGcasTo, supra note 36, at 152.
304. Mikva, supra note 1, at 610.
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ence, and tradition have put up to assure deliberation. At such times,
too, members may secure passage of measures which later prove highly
questionable, without full awareness of their true character.
30 5
Since legislators are subject to strong pressures and intense emotions, they
might act on expediency "rather than take the long view."' 30 6 Even when legis-
lators want to uphold constitutional values, facts are not always presented in an
orderly manner that permits rational and responsible analysis. The last days of a
Congress are a period of frenzy, forcing legislators to race against the clock and
make last-minute accommodations. The risk of error and miscalculation is high.
Nevertheless, a winnowing process occurs throughout the session that discards
many unconstitutional proposals. Congress needs to be judged not merely by
the ill-considered bills it passes, but by those that never survive because of con-
scientious review.
Judges are assumed to have "the leisure, the training, and the insulation to
follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. '30 7 Those
presumed traits, however, do not give judges a superior edge in balancing consti-
tutional values or investigating facts that underlie such constitutional provisions
as the commerce clause.30 8 Furthermore, judges cannot be expected to behave
with model objectivity or wisdom. Justice Jackson once remarked that
"[n]othing has more perplexed generations of conscientious judges than the
search in juridical science, philosophy and practice for objective and impersonal
criteria for solution of politico-legal questions put to our courts."
'30 9
No justification exists to defer automatically to the judiciary because of its
technical skills and political independence. Each decision by a court is subject
to scrutiny and rejection by private citizens and public officials. What is "final"
at one stage of our political development may be reopened at some later date,
leading to revisions, fresh interpretations, and reversals of Supreme Court doc-
trines. Members of Congress have both the authority and the capability to par-
ticipate constructively in constitutional interpretation. Their duty to support
and defend the Constitution is not erased by doubts about personal or institu-
tional competence. Much of constitutional law depends on factfinding and the
balancing of competing values, areas in which Congress justifiably can claim
substantial expertise.
305. D. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 360.
306. A. BICKEL, supra note 301, at 25.
307. Id. at 25-26.
308. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
309. Jackson, Maintaining Our Freedoms" The Role of the Judiciary, 19 Vrr. SPEECHES DAY
759, 759 (1953). The claims of impersonal judgments by members of the judiciary have been dis-
sected in a number of studies. See, eg., Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57
YALE L.J. 571 (1948).
19851

